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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey year, most important decisions in juvenile law
were made at the appellate court level. This article will discuss
cases concerning notice requirements for proceedings initiated
under the Juvenile Court Act in delinquency and abuse and neglect
cases,1 parental rights,2 the rights of parties other than parents to
be heard during dependency proceedings, 3 and the sufficiency of
* Assistant Public Guardian, Cook County Public Guardian Office; J.D., 1986,
Loyola University of Chicago; M.S.S.W., 1977, Columbia University School of Social
Work.
** B.A., 1986, Loyola University of Chicago; J.D. candidate, 1989, Loyola Univer-
sity of Chicago.
1. See infra notes 9-52 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 83-100 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 101-21 and accompanying text.
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evidence in juvenile cases.4 This article will also discuss an Illinois
Supreme Court decision concerning the determinate sentencing of
minors to the Department of Corrections,5 and the new legislation
that rendered inapplicable the decision.6
In the area of juvenile legislation, the Illinois legislature recently
passed two important bills. One provides that commitment of a
delinquent to the Department of Corrections must be for an inde-
terminate term.7 The second law establishes protections for chil-
dren in the child welfare system by identifying family preservation
services that the Department of Children and Family Services (the
"DCFS") must offer, and by requiring court documentation of ef-
forts made by DCFS and the probation department to prevent re-
moval of children from their homes and to facilitate reunification.8
II. CASE LAW
A. Jurisdiction
Notice requirements for proceedings initiated under the Juvenile
Court Act continue to pose problems in obtaining proper jurisdic-
tion over the parties involved in a juvenile court proceeding. The
Juvenile Court Act sets forth the requirements of valid notice to
interested parties who must be named as respondents.9 During the
Survey year, Illinois appellate courts addressed the problem of
properly invoking the court's jurisdiction in juvenile court proceed-
ings. Many decisions confronted problems concerning the neces-
sity of obtaining jurisdiction over the minor's parents or legal
guardian, the minor himself, and any person whose legal rights
could be affected by the proceedings.
1. Notice to Parents or Legal Guardians
Two appellate court cases specifically addressed the notice re-
quirements in delinquency proceedings. 10 First, People v. S. S. in-
4. See infra notes 122-60 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 53-72 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, paras. 704-1 to 704-4 (1985).
10. In re T.M.F., 155 Il1. App. 3d 1026, 508 N.E.2d 1160 (4th Dist. 1987); People v.
S.S., 146 Ill. App. 3d 681, 496 N.E.2d 1165 (lst Dist. 1986). For Illinois cases regarding
failure to provide notice to parents or guardians, see generally In re J.P.J., 109 I1l. 2d 129,
485 N.E.2d 848 (1985); People v. R.S., 104 Ill. 2d 1, 470 N.E.2d 297 (1984); People v.
R.D.S., 94 Ill. 2d 77, 445 N.E.2d 293 (1983); In re D.L.F., 136 Ill. App. 3d 873, 483
N.E.2d 1300 (3d Dist. 1985).
11. 146 I11. App. 3d 681, 496 N.E.2d 1165 (1st Dist. 1986).
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volved a petition for adjudication of wardship and delinquency, in
which failure to name the minor's legal guardian as a respondent
rendered the court's adjudication void for lack of jurisd;ction. 2
The petition for adjudication of wardship named the minor, his
mother, and his father as respondents.' 3 Paragraph 704-1(2) of the
Juvenile Court Act, however, requires that a minor's legal guard-
ian or custodian be named also as a respondent.' 4 The minor's rec-
ord revealed that he had been removed from his mother's custody
and was living with his paternal grandmother, his appointed legal
guardian.' 5 The record further revealed that sixteen days after fil-
ing the petition for adjudication of wardship, the State became
aware of the grandmother's guardianship of the minor.1 6
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that the
failure to comply with the statutory jurisdictional requirements
rendered the trial court's orders void for lack of jurisdiction. 7
Although the minor visited with his mother at the time the petition
was filed, the mother's presence at the proceedings did not meet
the notice requirements of the Juvenile Court Act.' 8
In re T.MF. 9 also addressed the problem of failing to serve a
necessary respondent. In T.MF., the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Fourth District reaffirmed the rule that failure to comply with
the statutory notice requirements of the Juvenile Court Act ren-
ders the court's orders void for lack of personal jurisdiction.2° In
T.MF., all interested parties were properly named as respondents.
The State, however, failed to obtain service upon the minor's natu-
ral mother.2' The court held that although the minor's parents
12. Id. at 683, 496 N.E.2d at 1167. The trial court found the minor guilty of volun-
tary manslaughter and adjudicated him a delinquent and a ward of the court. The court
placed him on probation for two years. Id.
13. Id. at 681, 496 N.E.2d at 1165.
14. Id. at 682, 496 N.E.2d at 1166 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-1(2)
(1985)).
15. Id. At the time the petition was filed, the minor was visiting with his mother for
the summer but remained under the guardianship of his grandmother. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 683, 496 N.E.2d at 1167.
18. Id. at 683, 496 N.E.2d at 1166 (citing People v. R.D.S., 94 Ill. 2d 77, 445 N.E.2d
293 (1983)). In a nearly identical fact situation, the Illinois Supreme Court in R.D.S. held
that failure to name and serve the legal guardian rendered the trial court's orders void.
R.D.S., 94 Il. 2d at 83, 445 N.E.2d at 294. At the time the petition was filed, the minor
was living with his mother but under the guardianship of the Department of Children
and Family Services. Id.
19. 155 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 508 N.E.2d 1160 (4th Dist. 1987).
20. Id. at 1029, 508 N.E.2d at 1162 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, paras. 704-1 to
704-4 (1985)).
21. Id. at 1027, 508 N.E.2d at 1163.
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were divorced, service upon the father alone was insufficient, par-
ticularly when the record revealed that the State knew the mother's
whereabouts at the outset of the proceedings.2 2 Therei'ore, the ap-
pellate court reversed the circuit court orders adjudicating the mi-
nor a delinquent and ward of the court, and remanded the case for
further proceedings. 23
2. Notice to Minors
During the Survey year, Illinois appellate courts once again con-
fronted the technical problem of proper notice to minors. In Illi-
nois, a minor cannot enter an appearance on his or her own behalf.
Rather, jurisdiction over the minor may be obtained only through
service of k "ocess.24 Prior to its being amended by the legislature,
paragraph 704-3 of the Juvenile Court Act required that service of
process be directed to the minor.25 Illinois appellate courts inter-
preted paragraph 704-3 to require personal service on a minor no
matter what his age.26 As a result, even an infant, upon whom
service would be incomprehensible, had to be served. Failure to
22. Id. at 1029, 508 N.E.2d at 1163 (distinguishing In re J.P.J., 109 I1. 2d 129, 485
N.E.2d 848 (1985)). In J.P.J., failure to serve a noncustodial parent whose whereabouts
were not known did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. J.P.J., 109 IlI. 2d at 136, 485
N.E.2d at 852. The court in T.M.E held that reliance on J.P.J was inapposite because
the mother's whereabouts were known, and it was not clear which parent had legal cus-
tody. T.MF., 155 Ill. App. 3d at 1029, 508 N.E.2d at 1162.
23. T.MF., 155 Ill. App. 3d at 1029, 508 N.E.2d at 1162-63. In remanding the case
back to the circuit court for further proceedings, the court indicated that failure to pro-
vide statutory notice merely deprived the court of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1029, 508
N.E.2d at 1162. The court, citing People v. R.S., 104 I11. 2d 1, 470 N.E.2d 297 (1984),
noted that the notice requirements are also jurisdictional requirements. Id. According to
the T.M.F. court, however, the supreme court in R.S. remanded the case to the circuit
court and indicated that subject matter jurisdiction was proper although the circuit
court's previous orders were void. Id.
Although T.M.F indicates that failure to comply with statutory notice requirements
merely deprives the court of personal, and not subject matter jurisdiction, it should be
noted that the question was left unresolved by the Illinois Supreme Court in In re J.P.J.,
109 Ill. 2d 129, 485 N.E.2d 848 (1985). See supra note 22.
24. Bonnell v. Holt, 89 11. 71 (1878).
25. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-3 (1985). The legislature, aware of the
technical notice problems, amended paragraph 704-3 regarding summons. Personal ser-
vice upon the minor is no longer required. The act, effective January 12, 1987, now
allows summons to be directed to the minor's legal guardian or custodian on behalf of the
minor. When the guardian or custodian is an Illinois state agency, proper service may be
obtained by leaving a copy of the summons with the proper employee of the agency. Id.
See also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-3 (Supp. 1987).
26. For cases in which failure to obtain service upon the minor deprived the court of
jurisdiction over the minor, see generally In re K.E., 151 I11. App. 3d 1055, 504 N.E.2d
191 (3d Dist. 1987); In re K.C., 154 I11. App. 3d 158, 506 N.E.2d 724 (4th Dist. 1987); In
re Pronger, 148 Ill. App. 3d 311, 499 N.E.2d 155 (4th Dist. 1986), cert. granted, 113 IlI.
2d 575, 505 N.E.2d 361 (1987); In re Crouch, 131 111. App. 3d 694, 476 N.E.2d 69 (4th
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personally serve the minor deprived the court of jurisdiction, and
thus rendered all orders entered by the juvenile court void. This
would result even when the minor and his legal guardian were
present.
In an attempt to solve the problematic requirements of service of
process on minors, the Illinois legislature amended paragraph 704-
3. Following the amendment, the court could obtain jurisdiction
over the minor through service upon the minor's legal guardian or
custodian, and to each person named as a respondent." During
the Survey year, no appellate or supreme court decisions addressed
the effect of the new summons provision in paragraph 704-3(1) and
704-5(c).
In In re R.A.B. ,28 however, the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Fourth District addressed a similar issue concerning jurisdiction
over the minor. In R.A.B., service was obtained properly on a mi-
nor pursuant to an original petition for adjudication of delin-
quency. 29 Three months later, the State filed a supplemental
petition for which no service was obtained upon the minor.30 The
court held a consolidated hearing regarding both petitions, and ad-
judged the minor a delinquent.3 1  The dispositional hearing re-
sulted in an order of probation. Subsequently, the court revoked
the probation and committed the minor to the Department of
Corrections.32
On appeal, the minor claimed that failure to serve the supple-
Dist. 1985), appeal denied, 106 Il1. 2d 554 (1985); In re Phillip Day, 138 I11. App. 3d 783,
486 N.E.2d 307 (4th Dist. 1985).
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-3 (Supp. 1987) (effective January 12, 1987),
(amended by Public Act 84-1460. See 1986 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-1460 (West)). After the
Survey period, the Illinois legislature once again amended paragraph 704-3(1) in an at-
tempt to further correct the technical problems of service to minors. 1987 I11. Legis. Serv.
85-720 (West). Public Act 85-720 amends paragraph 704-3(1) to provide that summons
need not be directed to a minor respondent under eight years of age, provided a guardian
ad litem is appointed and appears on behalf of the minor. Id. The new changes became
effective January 1, 1988. Id.
28. 146 Ill. App. 3d 993, 497 N.E.2d 811 (4th Dist. 1986).
29. Id. at 994, 497 N.E.2d at 12. The original petition charged the minor with four
counts of residential burglary. Id.
30. Id. The supplemental petition charged the minor with an additional offense of
residential burglary. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 995, 497 N.E.2d at 812. The dispositional order entered April 24, 1985 was
not appealed. On October 24, 1985, a hearing to revoke probation pursuant to proper
service was held. On December 4, 1985, the court entered an order revoking the minor's
probation and committing him to the Department of Corrections. It was this disposi-
tional hearing from which the minor appealed, presenting the question of jurisdiction for
the first time. Id.
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mental petition deprived the court of jurisdiction . 3 The minor rea-
soned that because the court relied on the supplemental petition in
reaching the order of delinquency during the consolidated hearing,
combining the petitions deprived the court of personal jurisdiction
and rendered the order of delinquency void. Thus, the minor ar-
gued that all of the subsequent orders were also void. 4
The appellate court rejected the minor's argument 5 and con-
cluded that proper service as to the original petition vested the
court with jurisdiction over the minor.3 6 The court further stated
that the circuit court had the power to enter an adjudicatory order
of delinquency pursuant to the original petition. Therefore, the
court rejected the minor's argument that joinder of the supplemen-
tal petition acted to deprive the court of jurisdiction. 37 Accord-
ingly, the court affirmed the dispositional orders.3 8
The appellate court in R.A.B. discussed also whether new service
is required if a supplemental petition is filed before the hearing of
the original petition.39 The court noted that the summons require-
ments in paragraph 704-3 of the Juvenile Court Act require service
33. Id.
34. Id. The minor made no complaint concerning the subsequent dispositional pro-
ceeding that revoked probation. Rather, the minor claimed that the subsequent order
was void because it was predicated upon a void adjudicatory order of delinquency. Id.
35. Id. at 995, 497 N.E.2d at 813. The minor relied on In re R.P., 97 Ill. App. 3d
889, 423 N.E.2d 920 (3d Dist. 1981). In R.P., a consolidated hearing was held for an
original and supplemental petition, both of which were properly served. R.P., 97 Ill.
App. 3d at 891, 423 N.E.2d at 921. The court held a separate hearing pursuant to a
second supplemental petition, for which service was never obtained. Id. The court en-
tered a single dispositional order pursuant only to the second supplemental petition. Id.
The appellate court in R.P. concluded that the dispositional order was void because it was
predicated entirely upon a void adjudicatory petition, for which no service had ever been
obtained. Id. at 893, 423 N.E.2d at 922.
The court in R.A.B. distinguished R.P., noting that unlike R.P., the adjudicatory order
entered by the circuit court in R.A.B. was entered pursuant to two petitions, one of which
was properly served. R.A.B., 146 Il. App. 3d at 995, 497 N.E.2d at 813. The court in
R.A.B. further noted that even had the court in R.P. proceeded pursuant to both the
original petitions and the second supplemental petition, the court would still reject the
precedent of R.E Id.
36. R.A.B., 146 Ill. App. 3d at 995, 497 N.E.2d at 813.
37. Id. at 996, 497 N.E.2d at 813. It should be noted that the court in R.A.B. ac-
knowledged that the combined adjudicatory hearing may have constituted error. Id. The
minor's failure to appeal from the dispositional order entered April 24, 1985, however,
waived any such error. Id. Nonetheless, the court concluded that any such error did not
deprive the court of jurisdiction. Id. In addition, the minor made no complaint concern-
ing the subsequent dispositional order revoking the minor's probation. Therefore, the
court affirmed the dispositional order committing the minor to the Department of Cor-
rections. Id. See also supra notes 32 and 34 and accompanying text.
38. R.A.B., 146 Il. App. 3d at 994, 497 N.E.2d at 812.
39. Id. at 997, 497 N.E.2d at 814. The court recognized that although the rights
afforded to minors in juvenile delinquency proceedings bear similarity to the rights af-
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and issuance of "a" summons upon the filing of "a" petition. 4  The
court stated that paragraph 701-15 defines "petition" to include a
supplemental petition.4 ' Therefore, the court concluded that the
plain statutory language clearly requires additional service for a
supplemental petition, even when filed before the hearing on the
original petition. The court, however, expressed its reservations
about whether the drafters of the act intended such a result. 42
3. Notice to Interested Parties
Due process safeguards require service of process to both minors
and their parents in juvenile proceedings. These safeguards extend
also to a party whose legal rights may be affected by the juvenile
proceeding. In In re S.A.C. ,'3 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Fourth District reversed a contempt order against an adult accused
of violating a protective order issued in a juvenile case."4 Although
the court had proper jurisdiction over the delinquency proceeding,
the court did not have jurisdiction to enter a protective order
against the appellant, Rasmussen, who neither had been named as
a respondent nor served with process. 5
The court explained that paragraph 705-5 of the Juvenile Court
Act allows a court in juvenile proceedings to issue orders of protec-
tion against any person "who is before the court on the original or
supplemental petition. ' 46  Paragraph 704-1(4) of the Juvenile
Court Act further requires naming any persons against whom pro-
tective orders are sought as respondents.4 7 Finally, paragraph 704-
3(1) requires the issuance of a subpoena to each person named as a
respondent.48 Therefore, the court concluded that the language of
forded an accused in criminal proceedings, the procedure followed in juvenile proceed-
ings adheres to the requirements of civil procedure, including service of process. Id.
40. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-3 (1983)).
41. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 701-15 (1983)).
42. Id. The court recognized the largely procedural nature of juvenile proceedings,
and questioned the required result of the statutory language. The court noted that the
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure allows petitions to be amended or supplemented without
further service while they are still pending. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 1-
101 to 19c-101 (1985)).
43. 147 Il. App. 3d 656, 498 N.E.2d 285 (4th Dist. 1986).
44. Id. at 659, 498 N.E.2d at 287.
45. Id. Rasmussen was physically present in the court room during the delinquency
proceeding. His appearance, however, did not constitute a waiver of the notice require-
ments. Id. See also infra note 52.
46. S.A.C., 147 I1. App. 3d at 658, 498 N.E.2d at 286 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
para. 705-5 (1983)).
47. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-1(4) (1983)).
48. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para' 704-3(l) (1983)).
1988]
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 19
paragraph 705-5 was subject to the provisions of 704-1(4) and 704-
3(1). 49 Because Rasmussen was neither named as a respondent nor
served with process, he was not before the court for the purposes of
paragraph 705-5, although he was physically present in the court-
room." Accordingly, the court concluded that the protective or-
der was void for lack of jurisdiction and declared the contempt
order a nullity.
Additionally, the S.A. C. court recognized that an adult respon-
dent in a juvenile case may waive the right to receive a summons
by making a physical appearance.5 The court stated, however,
that if a court order affects the legal right of a person to associate
with others, such an order cannot be entered unless that person is
afforded a reasonable opportunity to be present and heard at the
proceedings.5 2
B. Dispositions
In People v. S.L.C., s' the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the
49. Id. The Illinois legislature, after the Survey period, enacted Public Act 85-720,
amending paragraphs 705-5 and 704-1. See 1987 Ill. Legis. Serv. 85-720 (West). Public
Act 85-720 became effective January 1, 1988. Paragraph 705-5(1) has been amended to
delete the requirement that the person against whom a protective order is sought be
before the court on the original or supplemental petition. Id. The act amends also para-
graph 704-1(4) to delete the requirement that the person against whom a protective order
is sought be named as a respondent. Id. The changes appear to be in response to the
appellate court's decision in In re S.A.C. and effectively reversed that decision. See also
infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
50. S.A.C., 147 Ill. App. 3d at 658, 498 N.E.2d at 287.
51. Id. Such result could not be obtained in S.A. C. because although Rasmussen was
present during the juvenile case, he was never properly named as a respondent. There-
fore, the summons requirement could not be waived. Id.
52. Id. (citing In re Rider, 113 11. App. 3d 1000, 447 N.E.2d 1384 (1983)). In Rider,
the appellate court concluded that subjecting a parent to a protective supervision order
deprived the parent of fundamental fairness and due process because he was not repre-
sented by counsel. Although the father was named as a respondent and present in court,
without counsel, he was not afforded a fair opportunity to present his objection to the
order. The court in S.A.C further stated that, like the father in Rider, Rasmussen did
not have a meaningful opportunity to object to the court's issuance of the protective order
against him. S.A.C, 147 Il1. App. 3d at 659, 498 N.E.2d at 287.
It should be noted that Public Act 85-720, discussed supra at note 49, further amends
paragraph 705-5 to delineate the rights of a person against whom a protective order is
sought to be present and heard at the proceedings. 1987 Ill. Legis. Serv. 85-720 (West).
Paragraph 705-5(2) has been recodified as paragraph 705-5(4) and paragraphs 705-5 (2),
(3), (6), (7), (8) have been newly added. Id. Paragraph 705-5, as now amended, provides
that any person against whom an order of protection is sought has the right to be present
and heard at the hearing and to retain counsel. Id. Only a parent, guardian, legal custo-
dian or responsible relative, however, is a party or respondent with the additional right to
appointed counsel. Id.
53. 115 Ill. 2d 33, 503 N.E.2d 228 (1986).
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question of whether a trial court has the authority to commit a
minor to the Department of Corrections for a determinate period
of time. In S. L. C., the trial court adjudicated a minor a delinquent
and entered an order of wardship.5 4 At the subsequent disposi-
tional hearing, the trial judge orally committed the minor to the
Juvenile Division of the Illinois Department of Corrections for a
period of one year. 5 The written dispositional order, however.
simply committed the minor to the Department without refering to
the one year period.5 6 The minor appealed, challenging only the
correctness of his commitment, and not the adjudicatory order of
delinquency. The minor requested that the written dispositional
order be corrected to reflect the trial judge's oral pronouncement.5 7
The appellate court found that the trial judge had the authority
to commit the juvenile for a determinate period of time and re-
versed commitment for an indeterminate period. The court then
remanded the case for entry of the appropriate dispositional or-
der.5 8 The Illinois Supreme Court granted the State's petition for
leave to appeal.59
The Illinois Supreme Court noted that paragraph 705-10 of the
Juvenile Court Act governed commitment to the Department of
Corrections.' The court emphasized that pa"agraph 705-10 per-
mits a court to commit a delinquent minor adjudged a ward of the
court to the Department of Corrections. The court also indicated
that if such commitment takes place, the court must appoint the
54. Id. at 36, 503 N.E.2d at 229. The minor was charged with burglary, felony theft,
and misdemeanor theft. Id.
55. Id. at 37, 503 N.E.2d at 229.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing S.LC., 133 Ill. App. 3d at 230, 478 N.E.2d at 883 (3d Dist. 1985)).
59. S.L.C., 115 Ill. 2d at 38, 503 N.E.2d at 229. Prior to the State's filing of petition
to appeal on May 31, 1985, the trial judge entered an amended written dispositional order
committing the minor for a period of one year on May 17, 1985. Id. On September 6,
1985, the minor was released on parole. Id. On December 13, 1985, six days before expi-
ration of the one year commitment, an agreed order between the State and the minor's
attorney was entered providing that the minor remain under supervision of the Depart-
ment until the status of the original dispositional written order was decided by the Illinois
Supreme Court. Id.
Subsequently, the State filed a status report with the Illinois Supreme Court outlining
the changed circumstances. Id. The minor contended that expiration of his one year term
rendered the State's appeal moot. Id. at 39, 503 N.E.2d at 230. The State argued, how-
ever, that placement of the minor under the Department's supervision continued the De-
partment's jurisdiction over the minor, thus subjecting him to recommitment. Therefore,
the State claimed that the appeal had not been rendered moot. Id.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the appeal was not moot. Id.
60. Id. at 42, 503 N.E.2d at 231 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-10 (1983)).
1988]
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Assistant Director of Correction as legal custodian of the minor.61
Paragraph 705-10 further requires that when the Department law-
fully discharges the minor from its custody and control, the Assis-
tant Director must petition the court to terminate custodianship
over the minor.62
In addition, the court noted that the Juvenile Court Act pro-
vides that all proceedings under the Act regarding the minor auto-
matically terminate upon the minor attaining the age of twenty-one
years. 3 The Act also allows the court to terminate wardship at
any time, if the best interests of the minor no longer require
wardship.64
The minor argued that paragraph 705-10 did not mandate the
minor's committment until the age of twenty-one.65 In addition,
the minor argued that, pursuant to 705-11(2), the court could, in
its discretion, terminate the Department of Corrections's custodi-
anship before a minor attained the age of twenty-one.66 Therefore,
the minor contended, the trial judge had the inherent power to
commit the minor for a determinate period. 67 The State main-
tained that pursuant to paragraph 705-11(2), wardship must be ter-
minated prior to a court's termination of the Department of
Correction's custody because adjudication of wardship is a prereq-
uisite to commitment of a minor to the custody of the Department
of Corrections.68
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the State's argument, and
affirmed the appellate court's holding that the court could commit
a juvenile for a determinate period. 69 The court noted that two
distinct relationships exist between the Department of Correction's
custodianship and the court's wardship. Moreover, paragraph
705-8(3) of the Juvenile Court Act allows a court to terminate cus-
todianship prior to wardship.70 Paragraph 705-11(2) allows a
court to terminate wardship, and then terminate custodianship.7'
61. Id. at 43, 503 N.E.2d at 232.
62. Id. Unless the court orders otherwise, custodianship terminates automatically
thirty days after receipt of the petition. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-10(4) (1985).
63. S.LC., 115 III. 2d at 43, 503 N.E.2d at 232 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para.
705-11(1) (1983)).
64. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-11(2) (1983)).
65. Id. at 44, 503 N.E.2d at 232.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 45, 503 N.E.2d at 233.
69. Id. But see infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
70. Id. at 44, 503 N.E.2d at 232 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-8(3)
(1983)).
71. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-11(2) (1983)).
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Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that, because the
court had authority to terminate custodianship prior to the minor's
attaining the age of twenty-one, the court could also commit the
minor for a determinate period.72
In In re M.S.S., 73 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second
District held that a minor who had been adjudicated a delinquent
and found to be a drug addict could be committed to the Depart-
ment of Corrections. In M.S.S., the trial court adjudicated the mi-
nor a delinquent, and committed him to the Department of
Corrections.74 On the same day, the court found the minor to be
addicted to drugs, and placed him under two years of court super-
vision.75 The minor appealed the dispositional orders, claiming
that paragraph 705-2(1)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act prohibited
committing an addicted minor to the Department of Corrections.76
The appellate court agreed with the minor's interpretation of
paragraph 705-2(l)(c). The court noted, however, that the minor's
dispositional order for addiction did not violate that provision.
The minor's placement under court supervision fell within the per-
missible alternatives for disposition under paragraph 705-2(1)(C). 77
The court further stated that paragraph 705-2(l)(a)(5) 78 clearly
permits the court to place delinquent minors with the Department
of Corrections. In addition, the court held that paragraph 705-
2(1)(a)(3) gives the court discretion to require a delinquent ad-
dicted minor to undergo treatment for substance abuse rather than
placing him with the Department of Corrections.79
The alternative dispositional placement authorized by paragraph
705-2(l)(a)(3) becomes available only when authorized by the Al-
coholism and Substance Abuse Act.80 The Alcoholism and Sub-
72. Id. at 46, 503 N.E.2d at 233. The court noted that to accept the State's interpre-
tation of paragraph 705-11(2) would unnecessarily cause a conflict with paragraph 705-8.
In so interpreting 705-11(2), however, the court realized that a situation could arise in
which wardship could be terminated by a court, while custodianship continued. Id. at 45,
503 N.E.2d at 233. Nonetheless, the court declined to express an opinion on that issue.
Id.
73. 154 Il1. App. 3d 677, 507 N.E.2d 225 (2d Dist. 1987).
74. Id. at 678, 507 N.E.2d at 226.
75. Id. at 680, 507 N.E.2d at 226. Both dispositional orders were to run concurrently.
Id.
76. Id. at 680, 507 N.E.2d at 227 (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-2(1)(c)
(1985)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 681, 507 N.E.2d at 227 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-2(l)(a)(5)
(1985)).
79. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-2(1)(a)(3) (1985)).
80. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 6323 (1985)).
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stance Abuse Act provides that the trial court may place the minor
on probation and under the supervision of the Department of Al-
coholism and Substance Abuse if the court determines that treat-
ment may rehabilitate the addicted minor. 81 In M.S.S., the minor's
record evidenced his lack of commitment to past substance abuse
programs.8 2 Therefore, the appellate court concluded that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered dispositional
placement to the Department of Corrections.
C Parental Rights
During the Survey year, Illinois appellate courts once again ad-
dressed the standards for termination of parental rights. In In re
T. G. ,83 the plaintiff, the minor's mother, challenged the constitu-
tionality of an Illinois statutory scheme providing for termination
of parental rights. The plaintiff claimed that the statutory scheme
was unconstitutionally broad because it deprived parents found to
be unfit of residual noncustodial rights.8 4
The trial court found that the plaintiff's children had been
abused and neglected, and made them wards of the court.8 5 The
court, however, allowed the mother to exercise her noncustodial
right of visitation. 6 Subsequently, the State filed a supplemental
petition claiming that the plaintiff and the putative father were un-
fit. The trial court found the parents to be unfit and terminated
parental rights, including the plaintiff's visitation rights.8 7 Follow-
ing entry of the termination order, the court appointed a guardian
with the power to consent to adoption.88
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that paragraph 705-9(2) of the
Juvenile Court Act89 and paragraph 1501(D) of the Illinois Adop-
81. Id.
82. Id. The trial court considered the minor's past enrollment in several substance
abuse programs. Id. The record showed that the minor repeatedly failed to participate in
or cooperate with the programs. Id. Therefore, the trial court concluded that further
programs would have no rehabilitative effect. Id. at 679, 507 N.E.2d at 226.
83. 147 Ill. App. 3d 484, 498 N.E.2d 370 (3d Dist. 1986).
84. Id. at 487, 498 N.E.2d at 372.
85. Id. at 486, 498 N.E.2d at 371. The children were placed in foster care. Id. at 485,
498 N.E.2d at 371.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 486, 498 N.E.2d at 372. Following entry of the trial court's order terminat-
ing parental rights, the trial court granted visitation rights to the maternal grandmother.
On appeal, the court denied these rights to the grandmother. Id. at 490, 498 N.E.2d at
375. See infra note 100.
88. TG., 147 Il1. App. 3d at 486, 498 N.E.2d at 372.
89. Id. at 487,. 498 N.E.2d at 372 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-9(2)
(1985)). Paragraph 705-9(2) requires that in order to appoint a guardian with the power
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tion Act' unconstitutionally deprived parents found to be unfit of
fundamental, residual non-custodial rights, including visitation.
The plaintiff claimed that failure to incorporate a less restrictive
alternative than complete termination of parental rights provided
an unconstitutional statutory scheme.91
The Appellate Court for the Third District analyzed paragraph
705-9(2) of the Juvenile Court Act, and found that in order to ap-
point a guardian with the power to consent to adoption, a determi-
nation must be made that the parents are unfit pursuant to
paragraph 1501(D) of the Illinois Adoption Act.92 The court indi-
cated that a court must balance the best interests of the child with
the parents' right to continue in the legal status as parents.93 The
court explained that when evidence shows that the parents are un-
fit, parental rights yield to the best interests of the child.94
The court stated that once clear and convincing evidence9" es-
tablishes unfitness, the legal status of a parent terminates.96 The
right to exercise any residual, non-custodial rights is contingent
upon maintaining the legal status of a parent.97 Additionally, a
termination of parental status divests a parent of all parental
rights, including visitation.98 The court found that the trial court
to consent to adoption, the court must find that the best interests of the child are pro-
moted. Before such guardian can be appointed, however, non-custodial parents must be
found unfit under section 1501(D) of the Illinois Adoption Act. Id.
90. T.G., 147 Il1. App. 3d at 487, 498 N.E.2d at 372. Paragraph 1501(D) of the
Illinois Adoption Act sets out the standards for finding parents unfit. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 40, para. 1501(D) (1985).
91. T.G., 147 I1. App. 3d at 487, 498 N.E.2d at 372. The mother claimed that a
complete termination of parental rights when the parent is not unfit to exercise non-
custodial rights and where such exercise would not hinder the child's best interests, dem-
onstrates the unconstitutional broadness of the Illinois statutory scheme. Id.
92. Id. at 487, 498 N.E.2d at 373.
93. Id. at 488, 498 N.E.2d at 373.
94. Id.
95. Id. Under the Illinois Adoption Act, the standard of proof required for parental
unfitness is clear and convincing evidence. The United States Supreme Court mandated
this standard of proof as a due process requirement in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982). Id.
For Illinois cases upholding the clear and convincing evidence standard, see generally,
In re Sebrina Enis, 145 I1. App. 3d 753, 495 N.E.2d 1319 (2d Dist. 1986); In re
Hrusosky, 39 I1. App. 3d 954, 351 N.E.2d 386 (3d Dist. 1986); In re R.M.B., 146 Ill.
App. 3d 523, 496 N.E.2d 1248 (4th Dist. 1986); In re Dixon, 81 111. App. 3d 493, 401
N.E.2d 591 (3d Dist. 1980).
96. T.G., 147 Il. App. 3d at 488, 498 N.E.2d at 373.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 489, 498 N.E.2d at 374. The Juvenile Court Act identifies reasonable visi-
tation as part of non-custodial residual parental rights and responsibilities after a child is
removed from the home by court order. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 701-16 (1985).
The rights and responsibilities of visitation are provided in an effort to facilitate the re-
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proceedings clearly and convincingly established that the plaintiff
was unfit to maintain parental status.99 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that absent parental status, the plaintiff had no legal basis to
support an exercise of non-custodial rights."00
Although the issue presented in T.G. is raised frequently, the
plaintiff made the wrong claim. When a parent is found legally
unfit, the best interests of the minor requires the court to terminate
parental rights and prohibit fur..her child-parent contact. In some
cases, however, it may be in the best interests of the minor to main-
tain non-custodial ties with the parent.
Several states, for example, provide for open adoption. Open
adoption allows the birth parents and adoptive parents to agree to
terms regarding the type of permissable contact between the birth
parents and the adopted child. Such arrangements are especially
important when the child is past infancy and has maintained ongo-
ing contact with the birth parent. Whether to implement an open
adoption should be determined case-by-case. It should not be
based, however, on an argument that the Illinois statutory scheme
for termination of parental rights is unconstitutionally broad.
D. Right to be Heard in Juvenile Proceedings
During the Survey year, one appellate court case addressed the
turn of the child to the parents' home when the underlying conditions that necessitated
removal are remedied. When, however, the ward and the parents become subject to ter-
mination proceedings under the Illinois Adoption Act, the distinction between custodial
and non-custodial parental rights ceases to exist. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1501
(1985).
99. T.G., 147 II!. App. 3d at 489, 498 N.E.2d at 374.
100. Id. The court also addressed the corollary issue of whether the trial court prop-
erly awarded visitation rights to the maternal grandmother on the basis of Lingwall v.
Hoener, 1C8 Il. 2d 206, 483 N.E.2d 512 (1985).
In Lingwall, the Illinois Supreme Court held that grandparents could be granted visita-
tion privileges when parental rights were lost as a result of divorce or subsequent adop-
tion. Id. at 213, 483 N.E.2d at 515. The court in In re T.G., however, pointed out that
the Lingwall decision distinguished situations in which strangers were to adopt the chil-
dren. T.G., 147 Ill. App. 3d at 490, 498 N.E.2d at 374. When a stranger may adopt
children, all past ties must be severed to provide an incentive for adoption and the oppor-
tunity to create new stable family relationships. Id. Therefore, when parental rights are
terminated, a presumption arises that terminating any grandparental visitation rights
serves the best interests of the child. Id. Unless clear and convincing evidence establishes
otherwise, policy considerations in favor of adoption outweigh a grant of visitation rights
when parental rights have been terminated. Id.
Therefore, the court in T. G. distinguished Lingwall and reversed the awarding of visi-
tation rights to the maternal grandmother. Id. The court noted that parental rights had
been terminated, and a guardian had been appointed with the power to consent to adop-
tion. Id. Furthermore, the record revealed no clear and convincing evidence that contin-
uance of the grandmother's visitation rights served the best interests of the child. Id.
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rights of relatives and non-relatives to participate and be heard in a
dependency proceeding.' 0' In In re Winks, the State filed a petition
alleging that six minor children were dependent because they were
without a parent, guardian, or legal custodian. 02 The six children
resided with the appellants, Bette and Charles Winks, who were
named as original respondents. 103 On the State's motion, the court
ordered the Winkses stricken from the petition.° 4 The trial court
then adjudged the minors dependent and entered an order making
them wards of the court.10 5
On appeal, the Appellate Court for the Fourth District reviewed
only the order striking the Winkses from the petition. The court
noted that the Juvenile Court Act did not clearly delineate which
parties were entitled to participate in dependency proceedings. °6
Paragraph 704-1(2) of the Juvenile Court Act requires that various
persons, including those who have custody over the minor, be
named as respondents. 0 7 The Winkses argued that because they
101. In re Winks, 150 Il1. App. 3d 657, 502 N.E.2d 35 (4th Dist. 1986).
102. Id. at 658, 502 N.E.2d at 36 (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, para. 702-5(l)(a)
(1985)). Those who are dependent include any minor under eighteen years of age who is
without a parent, guardian, or legal custodian, or without proper care because of physical
or mental disability of a parent, guardian, or legal custodian. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
para. 702-5 (1985). Also included as dependent are minors of parents who wish to be
relieved of all parental rights and who consent to appointment of guardian with the
power to consent to adoption. Id. Minors adjudged to be dependent may be removed
from the custody of the parents, and placed under legal custody, guardianship or court
wardship. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-7 (1985).
103. Winks, 150 Il1 App. 3d at 658, 502 N.E.2d at 36. The minor children were
brought into the country and left with the appellants. The Winkses were named as re-
spondents on the original petition under the designation of relatives. The minor children,
however, bore no relation to the Winkses by blood or adoption. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 659, 502 N.E.2d at 36. The Winkses appealed both the order striking
them from the case and the adjudicatory order finding the minors dependent. Id. at 659,
502 N.E.2d at 37. The court, however, had no jurisdiction to review the adjudicatory
order of dependency because that order was not yet final as no dispositional order had yet
been rendered. Id. at 660, 502 N.E.2d at 37. An interlocutory appeal was improper also
because the Winkses' notice to appeal was filed before the dispositional order. Id. The
court stated that adjudicatory orders are appealable after ninety days if no dispositional
order has been entered. Id. Because the Winkses filed their appeal within the ninety days
and prior to the dispositional order, the notice of appeal was a nullity. Id.
For Illinois cases discussing the appropriate timeliness of an interlocutory appeal in
juvenile proceedings, see generally, In re E.L., 152 Il1. App. 3d 25, 504 N.E.2d 157 (1st
Dist. 1987); In re J.M., 151 11. App. 3d 1037, 503 N.E.2d 1167 (2d Dist. 1987); In re
Gonder, 149 Ill. App. 3d 627, 500 N.E.2d 1004 (4th Dist. 1986); In re Hershberger, 132
Ill. App. 3d 332, 477 N.E.2d 80 (4th Dist. 1985); In re Johnson, 102 I1. App. 3d 1005,
429 N.E.2d 1364 (1st Dist. 1981); In re Smith, 80 Ill. App. 3d 380, 399 N.E.2d 701 (4th
Dist. 1980).
106. Id. at 661, 502 N.E.2d at 38.
107. Id. at 662, 502 N.E.2d at 38 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-1(2)
Loyola University Law Journal
had physical custody over the minors, they should not have been
stricken from the case, but rather had a right to be present and
heard. 10 8
The appellate court agreed that paragraph 704-1(2) entitled the
Winkses to be named as respondents. The court, however, con-
cluded that they were not entitled to the right to be heard and to be
present. 10 9 The court stated that persons with merely physical cus-
tody are named as respondents only to ensure that they bring the
minor before the court, not to provide them with an opportunity to
participate in the hearing.110 Therefore, the court emphasized that
being a respondent does not necessarily entitle one to the right to
be heard."'I
The court also noted that only parents, guardians, legal custodi-
ans, or responsible relatives have the right to be heard as provided
in paragraph 701-20(1) of the Juvenile Court Act.' 12 In addition,
paragraph 701-20(2) provides that appointed foster parents also
have the right to be heard, but are not parties to the proceeding." 3
Therefore, the court concluded that only parties named as respon-
dents under paragraph 704-1(2) who meet the further qualifica-
tions in paragraph 701 20(1) or 701-20(2) have the right to be
heard. " 4
The court found that the Winkses did not fall within any of the
categories set forth in paragraphs 701-20(1) or 701-20(2).11' The
Winkses were not the minors' parents." 6 Nor did the Winkses
qualify as guardians or legal custodians because such status only
arises by a grant of authority." 7 The Winkses also were not related
to any of the children and thus could not qualify as responsible
(1985)). Paragraph 704-1(2) requires a petition initiating a juvenile proceeding to include
the legal guardian or the person or persons having custody or control of the minor, or of
the nearest known relative, if no parent or guardian can be found. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
37, para. 704-1(2)(1985).
108. Winks, 150 Il1. App. 3d at 662, 502 N.E.2d at 38.
109. Id. at 663, 502 N.E.2d at 40.
110. Id. at 662, 502 N.E.2d at 39.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 661, 502 N.E.2d at 38 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 701-20(1)
(1985)).
113. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 701-20(2) (1985)).
114. Id. at 663, 502 N.E.2d at 39.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 661, 502 N.E.2d at 38. The Winkses also contended that they should
qualify as standing in loco parentis to the children. The court, however, rejected this
argument because of the short duration of the relationship between the Winkses and the
six minor children. Id.
117. Id.
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relatives."8a Finally, the Winkses were not appointed foster par-
ents." 9 Therefore, the court concluded that the Winkses did not
have the right to be heard, even though they qualified as respon-
dents. 120 Thus, the court concluded that no prejudice resulted to
the Winkses by striking them from the petition.' 2'
The precedential value of this case may be limited because of its
unique fact pattern. The children in Winks were brought into the
country and left with the appellants without the Winkses obtaining
a court order declaring them legal custodians of the children. In
addition, the evidence indicated that the manner by which the
Winkses brought the children into the country was quite secretive.
The court suspected that the Winkses arranged for the children to
be smuggled into the country in order to adopt them.
The Juvenile Court Act is ambiguous with regard to who is enti-
tled to participate in a dependency proceeding. The Juvenile Court
Act does suggest, however, that a limited group of individuals have
a statutory right to be present and participate in juvenile adjudica-
tions. When circumstances indicate that it would be beneficial for
the child's custodian to be heard, the limited nature of the law does
not forbid a court from allowing the party to be heard. The law,
however, does not require that conclusion; the decision may be left
to judicial discretion.
E. Sufficiency of Evidence in Juvenile Proceedings
1. Abuse and Neglect Proceedings
Paragraph 704-6(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act provides that
prior statements by a minor relating to allegations of abuse or ne-
glect are admissible in evidence. 22 Such statements alone, how-
ever, cannot support a finding of abuse or neglect unless they are
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 663, 502 N.E.2d at 40.
121. Id.
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-6(4)(c) (1985). It should be noted that para-
graph 704-6(4)(c) requires a preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof, the
same standard as required in civil cases. In re J.H., 153 Il. App. 3d 616, 505 N.E.2d 1360
(2d Dist. 1987). In J.H., the appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
State's petition alleging abuse on the grounds that the standard of proof necessary to
prove abuse had not been met. Id. at 631, 505 N.E.2d at 1369. The State based its case on
the statements of the minor herself, which were neither corroborated nor subject to cross-
examination. Id. at 632, 505 N.E.2d at 1370. Because the trial court's findings were not
against the manifest weight of the evidence, the reviewing court affirmed. Id. at 633, 505
N.E.2d at 1371.
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corroborated and the minor is subject to cross-examination. 23 Ab-
sent the foregoing legislation, the previous out-of-court statements
would be inadmissible as hearsay. Consequently, challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting an order of abuse or neglect
often arise. The question usually hinges upon whether the corrob-
oration requirements of paragraph 704-6(4)(c) have been met. 24
During the Survey year, the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Fourth District addressed the question of whether the corrobora-
tion requirement violated the right to confrontation afforded by the
sixth amendment. 25 In In re KL.M., 26 the court adjudicated a
minor as neglected within the meaning of paragraph 702-4 of the
Juvenile Court Act. 127 The court entered a dispositional order
making the minor a ward of the court and placing her under the
guardianship of the Department of Children and Family Serv-
ices.128 Admission of a caseworker's and psychotherapist's hearsay
testimony that corroborated the minor's alleged complaints about
the custodial father supported the finding of neglect. 29
On appeal, the minor's custodial father contended that admis-
sion of the caseworker's and psychotherapist's testimony violated
his constitutional right to confrontation.3 0 The court responded
by stating that the sixth amendment affords the right to confronta-
tion in all criminal proceedings. 3' The court also opined that
although the right to confrontation may extend to purely civil pro-
ceedings,3 2 those confrontation rights do not apply as extensively,
particularly in cases involving juvenile proceedings. 33
The court then examined the relationship between the hearsay
rules and confrontation clause in order to determine whether the
123. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-6(4)(c) (1985).
124. For Illinois cases challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding
of abuse or neglect, see generally In re J.H., 153 Ill. App. 3d 616, 505 N.E.2d 1360 (2d
Dist. 1987); In re Custody of Brunken, 139 Ill. App. 3d 232, 487 N.E.2d 397 (5th dist.
1985).
125. In re K.L.M., 146 Il1. App. 3d 489, 496 N.E.2d 1262 (4th Dist. 1986) (constru-
ing U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
126. 146 Il. App. 3d 489, 496 N.E.2d 1262 (4th Dist. 1986).
127. Id. at 490, 496 N.E.2d at 1263 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 702-4
(1983)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 491, 496 N.E.2d at 1263. The minor, a four year old, was not permitted to
testify because of her tender age. Id. at 497, 496 N.E.2d at 1267.
130. Id. at 491, 496 N.E.2d at 1263. The testimony was admitted pursuant to para-
graph 704-6(4)(c). The respondent contended also that adjudication of neglect was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.
131. Id. at 494, 496 N.E.2d at 1266.
132. Id. at 495, 496 N.E.2d at 1266.
133. Id.
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respondent had been afforded due process. The court cited the
United States Supreme Court cases of Dutton v. Evans 34 and Ohio
v. Roberts'35 to bolster its position that the confrontation clause
and due process requirements had been satisfied. The court main-
tained that these cases require a search for trustworthiness and re-
liability, when out-of-court statements are admitted pursuant to a
hearsay exception. 136 The court then stated that in Illinois, hearsay
exceptions should comply with the confrontation requirements
enunciated in those opinions. 137
The court noted that under Dutton and Roberts, the confronta-
tion clause is satisfied when a hearsay declarant testifies at trial and
is subject to cross-examination. 3 8 If the hearsay declarant is not
present, but the declarant's unavailability is shown, the statement
may still be admissible when there is an indicia of reliability and a
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement. 139
The court then held that paragraph 704-6(4)(c) afforded the re-
spondent due process by "coming close enough" to the confronta-
tion clause requirements enunciated in Dutton and Roberts."4° The
court, however, narrowed its holding to apply only to the facts of
K.L.M. .41 The court reasoned that in juvenile proceedings involv-
ing young abused or neglected minors, the statements of the minor
were likely to be reliable, and the interests of justice would be best
promoted by allowing the evidence to be introduced. 42
The court stated that many cases of abuse could not be proven
without admitting hearsay testimony, and that the Illinois legisla-
ture must have considered this in enacting paragraph 704-
6(4)(c). 43 The court also recognized that another underlying pol-
icy of paragraph 704-6(4)(c) concerns protecting young minors
from the emotional trauma of testifying in abuse or neglect pro-
ceedings. 44 In addition, because paragraph 704-6(4)(c) applies
only to such a particular kind of civil case, the confrontation rights
encompassed by due process applied less strictly than in criminal
134. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
135. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
136. K.L.M., 146 Ill. App. 3d at 495, 496 N.E.2d at 1266.
137. Id. at 496, 496 N.E.2d at 1267.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 497, 496 N.E.2d at 1268.
141. Id. The court narrowed its holding to the particular facts of K.LM., noting that
other circumstances would require a case-by-case determination of due process. Id.
142. Id. at 497, 496 N.E.2d at 1267.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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cases. 45
The court then examined the evidence in light of the policy be-
hind paragraph 704-6(4)(c). The court concluded that the trier of
fact had a sufficient evidentiary basis upon which to weigh the
truth and reliability of the minor declarant's out-of-court state-
ments, even absent an opportunity for the respondent to cross-ex-
amine the minor. 46  The testimony of the psychotherapist
corroborated the testimony of the caseworker, thereby providing
an adequate basis from which to weigh the reliability of the minor's
out-of-court statements. The court then found that a combination
of this testimony and other circumstantial evidence constituted suf-
ficient corroboration of the hearsay evidence admitted regarding
the minor's out-of-court statements. Thus, the court concluded
that this corroboration adequately complied with the confrontation
requirements of Dutton and Roberts.147
2. Delinquency Proceedings
A delinquency proceeding arising under the Juvenile Court Act
is primarily criminal in nature. 48 Therefore, the applicable stan-
dard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. 149 This conclusion was
discussed in In re B.J.S. 110 In that case, the State filed a petition
for adjudication of delinquency and wardship, charging the minor
with criminal sexual abuse and assault. After the trial, the court
entered an order adjudicating the minor delinquent and a ward of
the State.15' The minor appealed, claiming that the evidence
presented failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 52
The minor contended that the evidence in support of the convic-
tion was uncorroborated and otherwise not clear and
convincing. 5 3
The appellate court agreed with the minor's argument. The
145. Id. at 497, 496 N.E.2d at 1268.
146. Id. at 493, 496 N.E.2d at 1265. The minor's tender age sufficiently justified her
unavailability to testify. Id. at 497, 496 N.E.2d at 1267.
147. Id. at 497, 496 N.E.2d at 1268.
148. In re B.J.S., 151 Il. App. 3d 1023, 1026, 503 N.E.2d 1198, 1200 (4th Dist.
1987).
149. Id. at 1028, 503 N.E.2d at 1201.
150. 151 11. App. 3d 1023, 503 N.E.2d 1198 (1987).
151. Id. at 1024, 503 N.E.2d at 1198. The minor respondent was twelve years old
and the incident involved his three-year-old stepsister. Id. The criminal sexual assault
charge was dismissed and the minor was found guilty of criminal sexual abuse. Id. The
dispositional order sentenced the minor to six months probation. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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court stated that if a defendant denies the charge of criminal sexual
abuse, the victim's testimony must be corroborated, or must be
clear and convincing. 5 4 Corroborating evidence can include an
eyewitness account, confession or admission by the defendant,
prompt reporting of the incidents by the victim, or medical testi-
mony supporting the allegation of sexual abuse. 5s
In B.JS., the State introduced evidence of two alleged incidents
of abuse.5 6 One incident allegedly took place in a garage. The
second incident occured in the victim's bedroom. The appellate
court could not determine from the record which incident was al-
leged in support of the sexual abuse allegation. 1 7 On appeal, the
State admitted the insufficiency of the evidence to corroborate the
allegations of sexual abuse in one of the incidents. 58 The State,
however, argued that the allegations of the second incident suffi-
ciently corroborated the allegations of the first incident. 59
The appellate court rejected the State's argument noting that the
trial court specifically referred to both incidents as corroborating
the charges of sexual abuse. The court also noted that the record
could not demonstrate that either incident alone was sufficiently
corroborated. Furthermore, the court found that none of the evi-
dence established that there was any physical contact directly link-
ing the respondent to the allegations charged. Therefore, the
appellate court concluded that reasonable doubt remained. Ac-
cordingly, the court reversed the conviction and the delinquency
adjudication." °
154. Id. at 1026, 503 N.E.2d at 1200 (citing People v. Leamons, 127 Ill. App. 3d
1056, 469 N.E.2d 1137 (4th Dist. 1984)).
155. Id. at 1027, 503 N.E.2d at 1200.
156. Id. at 1026, 503 N.E.2d at 1199. One incident allegedly took place in a garage.
The second incident allegedly occured in the victim's bedroom. The witness, the respon-
dent's fourteen year-old stepsister, Jody, testified that sometime during 1986 but prior to
May 10, 1986, she saw the respondent and the victim in the garage together. Apparently
the respondent was zipping his pants and the victim was pulling up her pants. They were
not, however, seen touching. Id. at 1025, 503 N.E.2d at 1199.
The second incident took place on May 10, 1986. Jody testified that she ran to the
victim's bedroom after hearing her scream. Jody testified that the victim told her that the
respondent had been in her room and touched her in the genital area. Jody testified,
however, that she did not see the respondent in the victim's bedroom. Id. at 1024, 503
N.E.2d at 1199.
157. Id. at 1027, 503 N.E.2d at 1200.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1027, 5C3 N.E.2d at 1201.
160. Id. For an Illinois case during the Survey year that held the evidence sufficient
to corroborate allegations of criminal sexual abuse, see generally In re E.S., 145 Ill. App.
3d 906, 495 N.E.2d 1334 (5th Dist. 1987).
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III. LEGISLATION
A. Public Act 84-1475. Commitment to the
Department of Corrections
Public Act 84-1475 became effective February 5, 1987.16w It
amends paragraph 705-10 of the Juvenile Court Act which governs
commitment of delinquents to the Department of Corrections. As
amended, paragraph 705-10(2) now provides that commitment of a
delinquent to the Department of Corrections must be for an inde-
terminate term. 162  The commitment automatically terminates
upon the delinquent's attaining the age of twenty-one, unless the
delinquent is discharged sooner from parole, or custodianship is-
terminated otherwise as provided by the Juvenile Court Act or
law. 163
The addition of paragraph 705-10(2) appears to be in response to
the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. S.L.C..' 64 The
decision in S.L. C. allowed original dispositional orders committing
a delinquent to the Department of Corrections to be set for a deter-
minate period of time. 65 After the recent modification of the Juve-
nile Court Act, however, the decision in S.L. C. no longer controls.
B. Public Act 85-985. Family Preservation
Public Act 85-985 166 amends provisions of the Abused and Ne-
glected Child Reporting Act (the "Reporting Act"), 167 the Depart-
ment of Children and Family Services Act, (the "DCFS Act"),168
and the Juvenile Court Act. 69 Public Act 85-985 became effective
December 22, 1987.170 The purposes of the amendments include:
preventing the unnecessary removal of children from their families;
facilitating the reunification of children in foster care with their
families; and providing support for adoptive families.
Public Act 85-985 amends paragraphs 2057.4 and 2058.2 of the
161. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-10(2).
162. Id. The act, as amended, does not eliminate any prior provision, and paragraphs
705-10 (2), (3), and (4) have been recodified as 705-10 (3), (4), and (5) respectively. Id.
163. Id.
164. 115 Ill. 2d 33, 503 N.E.2d 228 (1986).
165. See supra notes 53-72 and accompanying text.
166. 1987 11. '_egis. Serv. 85-985 (West).
167. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2051 (1985).
168. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 5001-41 (1985).
169. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, paras. 701-1 to 708-4 (1985).
170. 1987 Ill. Legis. Serv. 85-985 (West). The bill was certified December 22, 1987,
after Governor Thompson amendatorily vetoed the bill and the House and Senate ap-
proved his amendatory veto. Id.
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Reporting Act 17 1 to require that the Department of Children and
Family Services (the "DCFS") provide family preservation serv-
ices.172 The Reporting Act, as amended, mandates that the DCFS
notify children and families of the DCFS's responsibility to offer
and provide family preservation services, as identified in the service
plan.7 3 In addition, the amendments to the Reporting Act further
require that the Child Protective Service Unit 7 4 consider any bene-
fits Family Preservation Services may provide in determining the
necessity for removal of a child from his or her family.
Public Act 85-985 also amends paragraphs 5005 and 5006a of
the DCFS Act 175 by providing for family preservation services for
families whose children have been placed in substitute care, post-
adoption families, and families whose children are at risk of place-
ment. The DCFS Act, as amended, also creates an emergency
assistance fund to allow the DCFS to provide financial aid to fami-
lies. This fund may be used when such assistance is not available
through other public or private sources and the assistance is
deemed necessary to prevent dissolution of the family unit or to
reunite families who have been separated because of child abuse or
neglect.
The amendments to paragraph 703-6 of the Juvenile Court
Act 7 6 require the court to receive documentation by the DCFS or
the probation department of the reasonable efforts that were made
to prevent or eliminate placement. Paragraph 703-6, as amended,
further requires the court to document its findings regarding the
nature of the services offered and efforts made to prevent
placement.
The amendments effected by Public Act 85-985 are a response,
in part, to Public Law 96-272, the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980.177 That law requires the court to find that
171. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 2057.4 and 2058.2 (1985).
172. 1987 Ill. Legis. Serv. 85-985 (West). Family preservation services include all
services designed to prevent the placement of children in substitute care. The services are
also designed to reunite previously placed children with their families, when reunification
is an appropriate goal; or, in the alternative, to help maintain adoptiv. placement. Public
Act 85-985 further requires that the DCFS phase in such services over a five year period.
Id.
173. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2058.2 (1985). A service plan is a non-legal writ-
ten agreement between the agency and the client identifying the services to be provided
by the agency, and the client's responsibility regarding those services. Id.
174. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2053 (1985). The Child Protective Service Unit is
a subdivision within the Department of Children and Family services. Id.
175. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 5005 and 5006a (1985).
176. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 703-6 (1985).
177. 94 Stat. 500 (1980)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-676 (1982)).
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reasonable efforts' 78 have been made to prevent removing a child
from the family home or to facilitate returning the child to the
family home. Failure to meet the reasonable efforts requirement
results in lost federal reimbursement to the state for the cost of the
child's care.
Therefore, Public Act 85-985 follows the reasonable efforts re-
quirement of federal law in an effort to pressure the agency to de-
velop or provide needed resources both for the welfare of families
and to avoid the harsh repercussion of losing federal funds. Public
Act 85-985 sets forth services that must be made available to show
reasonable efforts. The amendatory veto of the bill by Governor
Thompson, however, removed the entitlement language from the
bill, and no monies have been appropriated to help enact the law.
Although many of the provisions can be implemented without ad-
ditional funding, the resources provision of the law cannot be ade-
quately developed. DCFS is still in need of additional funds to
implement family preservation services.
IV. CONCLUSION
During the Survey year, the cases in the juvenile law area high-
lighted a variety of issues. Like last year, the Illinois courts often
focused on the issue of notice in juvenile proceedings and at-
tempted to clarify the intent of legislation drafters on notice re-
quirements. The appellate court affirmed a termination of parental
rights, finding that the right of a parent to exercise residual non-
custodial rights after termination is not fundamental, and that the
Illinois statutory scheme that provides for termination is not un-
constitutionally broad. The court also narrowly interpreted provi-
sions in the Juvenile Court Act so as to limit the number of parties
who must be allowed to participate and be heard in a dependency
178. Id. "Reasonable efforts" is not defined by federal or state statutes. The reason-
able efforts inquiry requires that before removing a child for his or her safety, the agency
worker must consider whether there is any assistance -cash payments, services in lieu of
cash or social support services- that would likely enable the child to remain safely at
home. When feasible, the agency is to provide the assistance or be required by the court
to meet a substantial burden of justifying the failure to provide such assistance. Even if
the court finds that reasonable efforts have not been made, however, the court may still
determine that the child cannot be safely allowed to remain or be returned to the family
home.
For factors to consider in determining whether "reasonable efforts" were made, see
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, CHILD WELFARE
LEAGUE OF AMERICA, YOUTH LAW CENTER; NATIONAL CENTER FOR YOUTH LAW,
MAKING REASONABLE EFFORTS: STEPS FOR KEEPING FAMILIES TOGETHER; and D.
Ratterman, G.D. Dodson, and M. Hardin, REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PREVENT FOSTER
PLACEMENT: A GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTATION (1987).
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proceeding. Also, during the Survey year, Illinois case law on
hearsay continued to parallel the growing trend throughout the
country. This trend allows exceptions to the hearsay rule in depen-
dency proceedings so long as certain protections are provided.
This Survey year, the legislature addressed the issue of determi-
nate sentencing and thus established greater protections for mi-
nors. Judges can no longer sentence juveniles to the Department of
Corrections for specified terms. Currently, the Department of
Corrections also is involved in deciding the length of incarceration.
The legislature also passed a bill to provide greater protections
for children in the child welfare system. By statutory amendment,
the DCFS is required to provide family preservation services. In
addition, the Juvenile Court must receive documentation of rea-
sonable efforts made to provide those family services in order to
prevent unnecessary removal and to facilitate reunification of a
child and family.
In sum, the trend in Illinois continues to maintain a strict ap-
proach toward juvenile offenders. The courts and the legislature
also continue to show a more protective approach toward minors
in the welfare system and juvenile victims of abuse and neglect.
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